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The impact of stronger intellectual property rights in the software industry is controversial.  One means
by which patents can affect technical change, industry dynamics, and ultimately welfare, is through
their role in stimulating or stifling entry by new ventures.  Patents can block entry, or raise entrants'
costs in variety of ways, while at the same time they may stimulate entry by improving the bargaining
position of entrants vis-à-vis incumbents, and supporting a "market for technology" which enables
new ventures to license their way into the market, or realize value through trade in their intangible
assets.  One important impact of patents may be their influence on capital markets, and here we find
evidence that the extraordinary growth in patenting of software during the 1990s is associated with
significant effects on the financing of software companies.  Start-up software companies operating
in markets characterized by denser patent thickets see their initial acquisition of VC funding delayed
relative to firms in markets less affected by patents.  The relationship between patents and the probability
of IPO or acquisition is more complex, but there is some evidence that firms without patents are less
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Debate over whether the current U.S. patent system is promoting or hindering innovation 
has reached a crescendo: reflecting growing skepticism among economists about the overall 
impact of strengthened and expanded patent rights, Adam Jaffe has stated in testimony before 
Congress the that “the patent system—intended to foster and protect innovation—is generating 
waste and uncertainty that hinder and threaten the innovative process.”
1  These concerns are 
particularly acute in industries such as software and semiconductors, where products are highly 
complex, each embodying thousands of innovations, and where technological progress tends to 
be incremental and cumulative.  In such circumstances, critics argue, any “stimulating” effect of 
stronger patents on incentives to innovate will be offset, or even swamped, by the “stifling” 
effect of higher transactions costs, increased threat of litigation, and constraints imposed on the 
cumulative development of technologies by multiple blocking patents.   
Software has been a particularly important locus of innovation in the US economy, yet, 
notably, much foundational innovation occurred in the absence of strong patent protection, and 
until relatively recently many leading innovators in the industry, including highly significant 
firms like Microsoft, filed relatively few patents.  But changes in patent law and USPTO practice 
in the mid-1990s generated a surge in patenting in software that continues unabated.  With more 
than 100,000 software patents issued in the US since 1990, and ever-greater complexity and 
scale of software products, industry participants face an increasingly forbidding “thicket” of IP.  
With even quite modest products containing millions of lines of code and thousands or tens of 
thousand of inter-related component modules, any of which could potentially infringe one or 
more patents, the cost of “clearing” new products for potential infringement can be very large.  
Allegedly poor standards of patent examination in this area in the past may also have generated 
large numbers of patents with inadequate disclosure, and excessively broad claims, raising the 
                                                 
1 U.S. House of Representatives Oversight Hearing on the Patent System, February 15, 2007.     3
costs of determining the scope of existing IP, and increasing uncertainty about possible future 
litigation from competitors and non-competitors alike.   Figure 1 shows how dramatic the 
increase in software patenting has been.  The figure plots the total number of patents in force that 
are relevant to 27 distinct software product markets between 1980 and 2006.  Over this period 
the CAGR of the number of patents outstanding was 29.8%.  Over the decade 1994 to 2004 
alone, the number of patents in the average market grew by almost 500%, while the number of 
active firms grew by less than 300%.   
 
By 2006, the average market in this sample had 7370 patents in force, comprising over 
145,000 claims.  Data such as these suggest that costs associated with patents—such as searching 
prior art, building patent portfolios, and defending against the threat of patent litigation—have 
grown very substantially.  In software, entrepreneurial firms and independent inventors have 
played a very significant role in driving technical change, since the impact of these costs is likely 
 




















to be felt disproportionately by innovators with limited resources, and the pace of innovation 
may therefore be particularly vulnerable in this industry to the proliferation of patents.  To cite 
just two authoritative observers, Donald Knuth, author of The Art of Computer Programming 
and inventor of TeX, has stated that “I don’t think I would have been able to create TeX if the 
present [patent] climate had existed in the 1970s,” while erstwhile entrepreneur Bill Gates has 
opined that “If people had understood how patents would be granted when most of today's ideas 
were invented and had taken out patents, the industry would be at a complete standstill today.”
2 
“Innovation” is, of course, very difficult to measure consistently over time and across 
technologies.  In software, one useful indicator—recognizing the important role of new ventures 
in driving innovation in this industry—is market entry and the founding of new firms.  In a 
related paper (Cockburn and MacGarvie (2007)), we find that there are fewer entrants into 
software markets in which there are more patents, after controlling for the characteristics of the 
firm and market (including the average importance of patents in the market and the  stage of the 
product lifecycle).  Yet it is important to recognize that the “stifling” and “stimulating” effects of 
patents go hand-in-hand.  Patents may  limit innovation in particular areas, or make it more 
costly, but at the same time they may also promote innovation and entry by creating incentives 
for R&D, by enabling trade in technology, or by facilitating investment in early-stage firms.  In 
Cockburn and MacGarvie (2007) we also found that firms holding patents related to a software 
market are approximately three times more likely to enter that market than those who do not hold 
patents—a finding that focuses our attention here on the economic mechanisms through which 
patents can positively affect incentives to launch new products and new ventures, in particular 
their impact on the ability of new entrants to secure external financing from various sources. 
                                                 
2 Pignalberi (2004), Lessig (2002).   5
In this paper we attempt to characterize the extent to which entrants into a software 
market at any given point in time face a patent “thicket”—i.e. a “a dense web of overlapping 
intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually 
commercialize new technology”
3—and evaluate the impact of patent thickets on the interaction 
between new software ventures and capital markets.  
We hypothesize that patent thickets affect the ability of software start-ups to raise money 
from outside investors in two main ways. Firstly, the transaction costs of entering a market may 
be higher when that market has a patent thicket.  Patents that block a would-be entrant from 
producing or selling its product mean that the entrant must either bear additional costs of 
“inventing around” such patents, pay licensing fees to the patent holder, or accept potentially 
severe ex post penalties.
4  Noel and Schankerman (2006) provide evidence on the costs imposed 
by patent thickets from a sample of publicly-traded software firms by showing that market value 
decreases when patent rights held by a firm’s competitors are more fragmented, reflecting the 
higher costs of negotiating with more parties.   
Secondly, the uncertainty of the firm’s future profit stream may be higher when it faces a 
patent thicket.  Lemley and Shapiro (2006) argue that there are two types of uncertainty 
associated with patents: uncertainty about the commercial value of the property right granted to 
the inventor, and uncertainty about the validity and scope of the property right.  The latter form 
of uncertainty may be especially prevalent in software, a field in which patents were until 
recently not used to protect IP and which saw a dramatic growth of patenting following changes 
in the USPTO’s patentability guidelines in the mid-1990’s.  The lack of experience with software 
                                                 
3 Shapiro (2001), p.2 
4 Infringing valid patents can present the entrant with very substantial ex post penalties, such as damages judgments 
(tripled in the case of “willful infringement”) or the loss in value of assets stranded in the wake of an injunction 
obtained by the patent holder.   6
patents at the USPTO, combined with the ambiguity associated with what is covered by many 
patents in this sector, has meant that software developers face significant uncertainty about 
existing prior art and the possibility of being sued for infringement.  Bessen and Meurer (2008) 
find that software patents are more than twice as likely as other patents to have claim 
construction appealed to the Federal Circuit, and, which they take as an indicator of elevated 
uncertainty about the boundaries of patents in software.
5 
We look for evidence of the impact of increased transaction costs and greater uncertainty 
on new ventures in “thicketed” markets in the following ways.  First, higher anticipated 
transaction costs should affect negatively affect investors’ valuations of start-up companies, 
“raising the bar” for new entrants in terms of meeting minimum levels of profitability required 
by outside inventors, and thus reducing the number of entrants that receive funding from outside 
investors.  Once a firm becomes an incumbent, the effect of thickets is less clear: thickets may 
offer protection from entrants, or result in future additional transaction costs, with an ambiguous 
effect on the value of the enterprise and the probability that a firm goes public, rather than being 
acquired or wound up (after controlling for the positive effects of the firm’s own patent 
holdings).  Second, higher uncertainty about future profits should affect the timing of 
investments.  When investments are irreversible, the opportunity cost of current investment 
(versus investment at a later date) increases with uncertainty. Thus, increases in uncertainty 
increase the value of delaying investment.
 6 We hypothesize that higher uncertainty over the 
threat of litigation or other future patent-related costs increases the value of delaying investment.  
                                                 
5 Brian Kahin (2004) cites the hearings in 2002 on Competition and Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the 
Knowledge-Based Economy, held by the U.S. Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice at which 
Frederick J. Telecky of Texas Instruments stated that: “TI has something like 8000 patents in the United States that 
are active patents, and for us to know what's in that portfolio, we think, is just a mind-boggling, budget-busting 
exercise to try to figure that out with any degree of accuracy at all.” Kahin notes that, “If a company with TI’s 
resources cannot assess what they have in-house, it is difficult to expect a small company entering a market to 
evaluate what claims they may be facing.”  
6 Arrow (1968), Bernanke (1983), Dixit and Pindyck (1994), among others.    7
As a result, we expect that, after controlling for firm- and investor-level characteristics, firms 
operating in markets characterized by denser patent thickets, or markets in which the relevant 
prior art is less well defined, will see investments delayed.  We look for evidence of delay in 
duration models for the time elapsed until a new venture obtains funding from outside investors 
(both venture capitalists and corporate investors) for the first time, and in competing hazard 
models of the time they “exit” from the entrepreneurial phase via IPO or Acquisition.  Third, we 
examine which strategies may help firms succeed when faced with patent thickets.  Following 
Hall and Ziedonis (2003) and Ziedonis (2005), we hypothesize that start-up companies with 
patents will be able to use them in cross-licensing negotiations to defend themselves against 
litigation.  These patents may then act to reduce the transaction costs associated with operating in 
a “thicketed” market.  These firms should also face less uncertainty, and thus we expect 
investment will take place earlier.  
We believe this paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, it examines the 
impact of patent thickets on early-stage firms. Despite the potential importance of such firms as a 
source of innovation and productivity growth, we are not aware of other empirical research 
which is has examined these effects on entrepreneurial (in our case, small, young, private) firms. 
Secondly, we contribute to the literature on entrepreneurship by analyzing a data set that contains 
both venture- or corporate-funded firms from the SDC universe as well as pre-funding start-ups 
drawn from the CorpTech database.  This allows us to examine how funded firms differ from 
firms that do not obtain funding, and to analyze determinants of the timing of first investment.  
While other research has looked at differences between venture-backed and non-venture-backed 
firms in small samples, we are not aware of other papers that exploit as comprehensive a dataset 
as the one we use here. Finally, we exploit a methodology inspired by the differences-in-  8
differences approach to isolate the effect of stronger patent rights on entry and financing of early 
stage firms.  
 
Literature Review 
The literature on the “stifling” vs. “stimulating” effects of patents has looked for evidence 
of the impact of changing patent rights on innovation from quasi-natural experiments associated 
with legal changes.  These changes include the strengthening or instituting of patent systems in 
countries that previously had weak or non-existent formal IPRs (Sakakibara and Branstetter 
(2001) for Japan, Lanjouw and Cockburn (1997) for India, Moser (2005) on patent laws in the 
19
th century), changes in patent rights in confined to specific technologies (Scherer and 
Weisburst (1995) on pharmaceuticals in Italy), or a variety of other changes to patent law or 
patent office practice that enhance the strength of patent protection (Lerner (2002)).  Hall and 
Ziedonis (2001) document a surge in strategic patenting in the semiconductor industry following 
pro-patent policy changes in the 1980s, and Ziedonis (2004) shows that semiconductor firms 
patent more aggressively when the ownership of complementary patents is more highly 
fragmented. 
Bessen and Maskin (2007) and Bessen and Hunt (2003), have argued that more-and-
stronger patent rights have induced a decline in R&D spending in industries affected by software 
patents.  Noel and Schankerman (2006) show that the market value of publicly traded software 
firms decreases when patent rights held by a firm’s competitors are more fragmented, reflecting 
the higher costs of negotiating with more parties. Cockburn and MacGarvie (2007) find that 
software  markets in which there are more patents have fewer entrants, after controlling for the 
characteristics of the firm and market (including the average importance of patents in the market   9
and the  stage of the product lifecycle).  However, patents also play a role in stimulating entry: 
this paper finds that firms holding patents related to a software market are approximately three 
times more likely to enter that market.  Hall (2005) shows that patents have a particularly strong 
correlation with market value for entrants, and suggests that they play a role in helping entrants 
secure financing.  A recent study of patents in the software industry by Mann (2006) shows that 
software start-ups holding patents receive more investment from venture capitalists than those 
without patents, consistent with Kortum and Lerner’s (2000) finding that venture-backed firms 
hold more patents than start-ups receiving other types of funding.  Arora, Fosfuri and 
Gambardella (2001), Gans and Stern (2000), Gans, Hsu, and Stern (2002), and others have 
highlighted the role of patents and other formal IP rights in supporting a “market for technology” 
which provides an avenue for new entrants to realize value from innovation by licensing, or 
selling themselves to incumbents.  More recently, Gans, Hsu and Stern (2006) show that the 
resolution of uncertainty over the scope of IP rights associated with the grant of a patent leads to 
an increase in the probability of licensing for start-up companies, but find that patent grants are 
less important for licensing in software than in other industries.  Hsu and Ziedonis (2007), 
controlling for a variety of covariates including firm-specific fixed effects, show that a doubling 
in a start-up firm’s patent stock is associated with a 24% increase on average in investors’ 
valuations. 
In contrast to the number of papers that use datasets comprised exclusively of venture-
backed firms, the literature that models the probability that start-up companies obtain external 
investment from other sources is relatively sparse. Hellmann and Puri (2002) provide evidence 
on the impact of VC funding on start-ups, using a sample of venture-backed and non-venture-
backed firms. Kortum and Lerner (2000) perform a comparison of venture-backed and non-  10
venture-backed firms in Massachusetts, using the CorpTech directory to identify the set of non-
venture-backed firms. Goldfarb et al. (2006) investigate VC’s funding decisions using a database 
of all business plans submitted to a single VC between 1998 and 2002. 
Analyses of the role of uncertainty in the duration of investment in start-ups include 
Gompers (1995) and Guler (2007). Gompers (1995) investigates at the relationship between the 
staging of venture investment and agency costs in the presence of asymmetric information, 
arguing that venture capitalists will monitor portfolio companies more frequently when agency 
costs are higher, leading to more rounds of investment with shorter periods between rounds. 
Guler (2007) studies the management of investments by venture capitalists as an example of the 
management of real options, using the number of rounds of financing as an indicator of delayed 
investment. 
Empirical analyses of exits via IPO include Lerner (1994), Gompers (1995), and more 
recently, Giot and Schwienbacher (2007) and Ljungqvist, Hochberg, and Lu (2007). Factors that 
have been found to influence the probability of going public include market conditions and 
industry-specific effects, the stage of development of the firm, the geographical location of the 
firm, the amount invested and number of investors, and the investors’ experience level. Giot and 
Schwienbacher estimate a competing-risks model that allows for multiple types of exit. We 
perform a similar analysis in this paper by considering the factors that lead to exit by IPO, 
acquisition, or liquidation. 
 
Empirical Approach 
As in Cockburn and MacGarvie (2007), our approach here is to estimate reduced form 
regressions in which we look for evidence of an association between measures of patent thickets   11
and indicators of entry and financing of new ventures, controlling for other market 
characteristics, such as demand, market structure, and the state of technology.   
One obvious potential problem is endogeneity: the nature of the patent thicket prevailing 
in these markets presumably reflects optimizing responses to the competitive environment.  We 
believe that any endogeneity bias is quite limited.  First, in all of our regressions we use market 
fixed effects, so that our identification comes from within-market changes in the patent thicket 
and the outcomes of interest rather than from purely cross-sectional correlations.  Second, while 
incumbents may endogenously respond to the competitive threat posed by potential entrants by 
filing additional patents, we believe the influence of this on patent thickets to be quite limited 
and where it exists it will bias our coefficients toward zero, leading to underestimates rather than 
overestimates of any causal effect of patents on entry.  The timing of incumbents’ patent grants 
(or their ability to obtain patent protection at all) is in large part affected by exogenous changes 
in resources and policy at the Patent Office.  The average time between patent application and 
grant in our dataset is close to three years.
7 Given the high speed of product cycles and turnover 
in the software industry, incumbents filing patents in response to threats from competitors will in 
most cases be unable to use the granted patents until well after entry has taken place, and the 
infringing product has been superseded.  Because of this, a substantial portion of the thicket 
faced by entrants in any market is composed of patents obtained far in the past, and by non-
competitors.  Thus, after controlling for time-invariant unobserved effects, and a variety of other 
potential sources of bias (such as confounding growth in the patent thicket with maturity of the 
technology in a market), endogeneity of our thicket measures created by incumbents’ responses 
to time-varying shocks to the threat of entry appears not to be a major issue.  In Cockburn and 
                                                 
7  According to the USPTO website, “The length of this delay is determined by many factors, including PTO 
workload, budget and manpower levels, and patent printing schedules…[for example,] The 1986 patent grant data 
are lower than would have normally been expected due to a lack of printing funds.”   12
MacGarvie (2007) we used an instrumental variables approach to address the potential 
endogeneity of patenting by incumbents, and obtained essentially identical estimates.   
Here we additionally exploit a series of changes in the legal regime that substantially 
expanded patentability of software inventions, the number of software patents granted increased 
dramatically during the 1990s.  These changes can be thought of as a quasi-experiment in which 
the strength of issued patents exogenously increased, raising barriers to entry in markets with 
more patents relative to markets with fewer patents. This allows us to examine market-level 
patterns of entry and financing before and after changes in the legal regime using a differences-
in-differences approach.  In this model, for any there to any bias arising from a correlation 
between financing/entry and patents induced by omitted variables, the relationship between 
financing/entry and the omitted variable(s) in question would have to occur simultaneously with 
the changes in software patentability that took place during our sample.  Revisiting Cockburn 
and MacGarvie (2007), our first key result is that the rate of entry is negatively correlated with 
the number of patents in a market, and that this correlation intensified following changes in 
patentability standards.  We find similar effects for our financing measures – the correlation with 
patents in a market becomes more negative following market-specific regime changes in 
patentability. 
This result is provocative, but leaves open the question of why exactly the rate of entry 
falls, and in particular why young, specialized firms are more affected. One leading hypothesis is 
that the intensification of patent thickets as barriers to entry reduces the expected profits of early-
stage firms, thus reducing the attractiveness of these companies as targets for investment.  
We therefore turn to a second hypothesis, that patent thickets affect entry by making it 
more difficult for early-stage firms to acquire funding.  Using the same differences-in-  13
differences approach, we examine the impact of increased patenting on the financing of software 
ventures at two stages in their life cycle: the period from birth to initial funding by external 
investors, and the period from first funding by external investors through to exit via IPO or 
acquisition.   
We focus on the following questions:  
1. Are start-up firms facing a patent thicket less likely to receive venture capital 
investment or corporate funding? We hypothesize that firms operating in markets characterized 
by patent thickets face higher costs of entry (consistent with Noel and Schankerman (2006)), and 
that investors’ expected return on investment in such markets will be lower, leading to a 
reduction in the likelihood of receiving outside funding  
2. Do thickets delay or reduce the likelihood of going public or being acquired, or do they 
increase the likelihood of acquisition relative to IPO?  If patent thickets are a significant barrier 
to entry or source of increased costs for entrepreneurial firms, we expect that they will reduce 
investors’ expected returns from an IPO and therefore reduce the probability of going public. On 
the other hand, larger established companies may find it easier to navigate the patent thicket due 
to deeper pockets or experience with the patent system, so that start-ups facing a thicket may be 
relatively more likely to be acquired by other companies rather than go public. 
3. Do thickets delay and/or reduce investment (through their impact on uncertainty)? 
With higher uncertainty we expect the option value of delaying an investment to be higher, and 
therefore see investment take place later in markets with a higher degree of uncertainty about the 
scope and validity of patents 
  Recognizing the potential stimulating effects of patents, we also ask whether the above 
effects of patent thickets are mitigated for start-up firms that themselves hold patents.    14
 
Data 
Market and firm characteristics 
The firms we study are drawn from the CorpTech directory of technology companies, 
which covers 19,717 public and private firms active in software markets over the period 
1990-2004.
8  We know the founding date of the firm, revenues and employment for most (but 
not all) of the firms in the dataset, the patents held by the firm, information on corporate parents, 
funding sources, and a number of other variables.  To the CorpTech sample, we add data from 
SDC’s VentureXpert database. We use information on the number of rounds received, the 
amounts invested, the identities of investors, the stage of the investment, the founding date of the 
venture, and whether the venture ultimately went public or was acquired, and the name of the 
acquirer when relevant. We also use Compustat data on the sales, employment, and 2-digit SIC 
codes of corporate investors. 
The CorpTech data contains fine-grained information on the product classes in which the 
firm develops software (the “SOF category”). This self-reported variable can include products 
under development as well as products already launched.  CorpTech reports more than 290 SOF 
categories, however many of these are quite vaguely defined, or appear to be defined in terms of 
customer segments rather than in terms of a technology—e.g. “secondary school software, dental 
practice management software, etc.”  Furthermore mapping patents to markets is a challenging 
and resource-intensive task.  We therefore focus our analysis on 27 of these SOF-defined 
markets, listed in Table A.1.  These 27 markets were chosen primarily to facilitate subsequent 
matching to patent data, primarily on the basis of our assessment as to whether the 
                                                 
8  We define software companies as the firms listed in CorpTech as having at least one product classification 
beginning with “SOF”, which is CorpTech’s code for software.   15
technology/product is reasonably distinctive, and we could define a set of keywords that could be 
fruitfully searched in the abstract of patent documents.
9   
Tables 1a and 1b show the number of firms of various types in successive CorpTech 
years and in each market.  As can be seen from these tables, there is substantial variation in the 
cross-section and over time in the size of these markets, in terms of the number of producers, the 
number of entrants, the number of “new” entrants (i.e. firms founded no more than two years 
before they appeared as entrants in the CorpTech database) and the fraction of these entrants that 
receive external funding from either VCs or corporate investors.  The number of “new” entrants, 
as opposed to firms which are new to the market in question, but already have an established 
presence in other markets, is quite small—averaging 2.2 per market per year over the entire 
sample—particularly in relation to the number of incumbents, which averages more than 157.  
(This figure is likely to be an underestimate of the fraction of entrants into these markets that are 
“new”, reflecting issues with the way that CorpTech collects data, and our quite stringent screen 
for identifying new versus continuing ventures.)  Among these new entrants, 16% receive 
external funding from VCs prior to the year in which they enter the market, while only 6% 
receive funding from a corporate investor at this point in their lifecycle.  
Tables 2a and 2b provide some further summary statistics on the markets into which 
these firms are entering.  We do not have market-level sales data, but we construct a proxy based 
                                                 
9 Clearly there is some potential for selection bias to influence our results, however we believe that the criteria used 
to choose these markets are independent of entry and exit dynamics and the sample of 27 SOFs does not appear to 
be markedly different from the other 262 in terms of firm characteristics and entry and exit rates (see the Appendix).  
One area in which our sample differs, however, is in terms of the average number of patents held by firms active in 
the market.  The average firm active in one of the sample markets has 29 patents, while the average firm in a market 
omitted by the sample has only 18 patents, and this difference is statistically significant.  Note though that this 
difference arises by construction: it is difficult, if not impossible to identify patents related to many of the more 
vaguely defined markets.  In our judgment, therefore, this subset of markets is reasonably representative of software 
products in general. 
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on the sales of firms active in a market.
10 On average, markets in this sample have a total of 
$1.7bn in annual sales, with substantial growth over time.  Markets range widely in size, from 
less then $70MM per year in sales to over $6.5BN.  
  Patents 
Identifying the set of patents relevant for firms operating in a particular market is not a 
trivial task.  Cockburn and MacGarvie (2007) describe the process used to match USPTO patent 
classifications to the CorpTech SOF categories.
11  In short, we used a combination of text 
searching and reading the manual of patent classification to identify the set of key patents 
associated with each market.  Using the mapping between patent classes and CorpTech product 
markets described above, we obtained all the relevant patents in these classes from the NBER 
Patent Database.  Table 3 shows the annual count of patents that meet these criteria, by grant 
date and application date.  There is a striking increase in the number of patents over time: annual 
patent grants relevant to this set of 27 product markets increased more than 40-fold between 
1980 and 2006.  The table also shows the number of patents expiring each year, either because 
they have reached full term, or because the assignee has failed to pay maintenance fees.  These 
expirations represent a non-trivial fraction of the total number of patents in force:  in the late 
1990s, for example, new patents were being added to the sample at a rate of about 7000 per year, 
while about 1200 were being removed from the “patent stock.”  (Once patents expire, they are 
excluded from our subsequent calculations.)   
                                                 
10 For firm i active in in market j as well as n other markets, we compute average sales per market in market j as 
SALESi/n (the total sales of the firm divided by the number of markets in which it is active). We then add up the 
average sales per market for all firms active in the market. CorpTech contains a numerical sales variable as well as a  
categorical variable that indicates the range in which the firm’s revenues fall. A significant portion of observations 
on the former are missing, and we fill in these observations with the mid-point of the range indicated by the 
categorical sales variable.   
 
11 Arora et al (2007) use a related approach to create a comprehensive concordance between USPTO classes and 
software product categories.   17
Tables 4a and 4b present statistics on the characteristics of the 108,863 patents issued 
since 1977 that we have determined to be relevant to one or more the 27 product markets 
considered here.  As can been seen in Table 4a, there are very large changes over time in patent 
characteristics such as the average number of claims, which doubles between 1980 and 2006, the 
average number of backward citations, which almost triples over this period, and the average 
number of citations to non-patent literature, which increase 10-fold.  While some of the growth 
in citations reflects growth in the pool of references available to be cited, these figures also 
suggest significant changes in the nature of the patent rights being awarded and the stringency of 
patent examination.   
As Figure 2 shows, there is substantial variation the numbers of patents issued in 
different technology classes as well as in trends in patenting in different technology classes  
Figure 2 
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After mapping these classes to product markets this variation is reflected in substantial cross-
sectional and time series differences between these markets in the number of patents granted.  As 
can be seen in Table 4b, in some markets only a few hundred patents met our search criteria, 
while in others there are more than 16,000 patents issued over the sample period.  Less 
substantial differences are also apparent in the average number of claims and in the amount of 
patent and non-patent prior art that is cited.  (Note though that ANOVA F-tests strongly reject 
the hypothesis of equality of means across markets for all of these measures.) 
Markets also differ in the extent to which the patent thicket has grown over time.  As 
shown in Table 4a, the compound annual growth rate of patents in force between 1980 and 2006 
is positive for all markets, but ranges from 12% per year to 31%. 
Quantitative measures of patent thickets 
Patents that block a would-be entrant from producing or selling its product can clearly be 
a significant barrier to entry.  The entrant must either bear additional costs of “inventing around” 
such patents, pay licensing fees to the patent holder, or accept potentially severe ex post 
penalties.
12  As a first step towards characterizing the patent “landscape” in a market, we 
therefore compute the cumulative stock of patents in the markets in which each ventures 
operates, as an indicator of the overall amount of intellectual property faced by the venture.
13  
However, it may not be just the absolute number of patents in an area that can deter entry, 
but also the extent to which those patents form a “thicket” in the sense of generating transactions 
costs above and beyond simple blocking power.  As Shapiro (2001) puts it, “a patent thicket is a 
                                                 
12 Infringing valid patents can present the entrant with very substantial ex post penalties, such as damages judgments 
(tripled in the case of “willful infringement”) or the loss in value of assets stranded in the wake of an injunction 
obtained by the patent holder. 
13 We do this in two ways.  Following the literature, we compute a stock of patents based on the flow of patents 
relevant to each market that issued each year, using the perpetual inventory method and the “Griliches constant” 
15% depreciation rate.   Alternatively, we also total the number of patents relevant to the market that are in force in 
any given year, assuming a 17 year term, and taking account of patents that expire earlier due to failure to pay 
maintenance fees.   19
dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through 
in order to actually commercialize new technology.  With cumulative innovation and multiple 
blocking patents, stronger patent rights can thus have the perverse effect of stifling, not 
encouraging, innovation.”
14   
Ziedonis (2004) and Noel and Schankerman (2006) argue that a key factor driving 
transactions costs may be the degree to which ownership of patent rights is fragmented.  Suppose 
a prospective entrant were to obtain licenses from holders of blocking patents.  The factors 
determining the total cost of obtaining licenses to allow entry are complex.  All else equal, we 
expect that the more patents that must be licensed, the higher the total cost of entry.  However, 
particularly in complex technologies, patents are frequently bundled or pooled, or jointly 
licensed, thus total costs of entry may not have a simple linear relationship to the number of 
patents blocking the would-be entrant.  Another salient feature of “thickets” is the higher costs 
associated with negotiating with many parties.  To the extent that there are fixed costs of 
conducting a negotiation, having to conduct more negotiations will drive up costs.  In addition, 
the outcome of a complex bargaining process conducted with many licensors, each of whom has 
some holdup power, may result in higher total costs—i.e. the height of the “royalty stack” may 
rise non-linearly in the number of its components.   
Following Ziedonis and Noel and Schankerman we capture this second effect by 
measuring the concentration of IP ownership in each market using patent citations.
15  Patent 
citations are references to existing patented technologies, listed in the patent document.
16  Since 
these citations delimit the property rights represented by a patent by describing related claims 
                                                 
14 P. 2 
15  In Cockburn and MacGarvie (2007) we use an alternative measure, a count of the number of cited assignees in 
each market. 
16 “Prior art” is not confined to patents, indeed most forms of printed publication describing the claimed invention 
can constitute prior art, as can public knowledge, use, or sale of the technology.   20
contained in other patents, citations made by a patent give an indication of the extent to which a 
technological area is already covered by intellectual property rights and is thus (in principle) 
foreclosed to entrants who do not obtain a license.  Assuming that the share of citations received 
by an assignee proxies the importance of negotiating with that assignee, we postulate that in a 
market which has many cited assignees but where citations go disproportionately to a small 
number of firms, entry costs may actually be lower than in a market with fewer assignees each of 
which receives a similar share of total citations.  To capture this effect, we calculate the 
Herfindahl index of citations over assignees for each market in each year.
17  Table 5 shows the 
mean values of this measure over time and for each market in our sample. 
Some of these patent measures will be correlated with the maturity of the technology.  
Gort and Klepper (1982), for example, document an increase in patenting as technologies reach 
the late stages of the product life cycle.  We want to separate the effects of increased patenting at 
any given stage of the technology life cycle from the natural accumulation of larger patent stocks 
as time passes.  To control for the average maturity of technology in the product market, we use 
the modal citation lag.  Since the number of citations to a patent is a function of the number of 
potential citations, we estimate the modal lag using a framework that adjusts for this effect.  For 
each product class and citing-cited year pair, we compute the citation frequency, or ratio of 
actual to potential citations (see Jaffe and Trajtenberg (1999)), and then identify the citation lag 
(citing year – cited year) with the highest citation frequency for a given product class and citing 
year.
18  If the modal lag in a product category is short, it implies that the most highly cited 
                                                 
17  We also experimented with using the Herfindahl index of citations across assignees to measure concentration of 
patent rights, but obtained very similar results to those based on the four-assignee concentration index.  These results 
are available from the authors upon request. 
18 We compute the citation frequency as the ratio of the number of observed citations to the number of potential 
citations. That is, if Ckgd is the number of citations made to patents in market k in citing year g to patents granted in 
market k in cited year d, Pkg is the number of patents granted in class k in year g, and Pkd is the number of patents 
granted in class k in year d, the citation frequency is Ckgd/(Pkg Pkd)   21
patents in that market were granted recently, which suggests that the market is at a relatively 
early stage of the product cycle.
19  Average values by year are listed in Table 2a. 
Quantitative measures of uncertainty about patent rights 
Capturing market participants’ ex ante uncertainty about the scope and validity of the 
patents that they face is clearly a substantial challenge.  Based on discussions with practitioners 
and our reading of the ongoing debates about “patent quality” we identify two aspects of patents 
that may signal that their scope and validity may be difficult to assess.  First, we look at the 
number of non-patent references cited as prior art.  Software patent applications (and their 
review by the patent office) have been widely criticized for failing to recognize or consider 
relevant prior art in the form of articles in professional journals, trade press, widely circulated 
product manuals and the like, which could potentially have sharply reduced the scope of claims 
allowed.  According to this view, patents with very few citations to this type of prior are more 
likely to be held invalid if subjected to legal challenge.  (Of course, it may be that these patents 
reflect truly innovative inventions for which no prior art existed.)  Arguably, therefore, markets 
with many of such patents are ones in which the degree to which the technology space is 
“covered” is particularly hard to assess.   
Secondly, we compute the average number of claims per patent in a market.  Arguably 
that the difficulty of assessing the scope of a patent is increasing in the number of claims.  One of 
the USPTO’s recent initiatives to improve patent quality has been to limit the number of claims 
in a patent to no more than 25 (with no more than 5 independent claims.)  Further, Allison et al. 
(2004) show that patents with larger numbers of claims are more likely to be litigated, and while 
the likelihood of litigation is undoubtedly related to the value of the patent, it is also more likely 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
19 The usefulness of this variable as an indicator of the stage of the product cycle obviously depends on the 
assumption that the key inventions are patented, or at least that the patented inventions   22
to occur when parties disagree over the validity or scope of the patent—i.e. when there is greater 
uncertainty.
20  We calculate the ratio of the number of claims allowed on a patent to the number 
of patents (both US and foreign) cited.  Our reasoning is that patents with a very large number of 
claims and very few citations to prior art are whose validity and scope are likely to be 
particularly difficult to assess.  (Such patents are sometimes referred to by practitioners as 
“problem patents.”) 
Mean values of these measures for each market in our sample are shown in Table 5.  The 
average patent has 2.15 patent citations per claim, with industry averages ranging from 1.67 to 
2.72.  Variation in this ratio across markets is statistically significant: an ANOVA F-test strongly 




I. Impact of patent thickets at the market-level 
Tables 6 and 7 give estimates of the impact of patent thickets on market level measures of 
activity by new software ventures.  In Table 6, the dependent variable in the regressions in the 
number of new entrants in each market in each sample year.  In Table 7 we look at the impact of 
patent thickets on three measures of financing activity: the number of firms receiving an initial 
round of funding from external investors in that market-year, the median amount invested per 
firm in that market-year, and the number of IPOs in that market/year. 
In each of these regressions we focus on the number of patents in force as an explanatory 
variable, controlling for market size, market structure and demand using market and year fixed 
effects, the number of incumbents (and its square), the growth rate of sales, for the quality of 
                                                 
20  See also Bessen and Meurer (2006).   23
patents in the market using the average number of forward citations received per patent in force, 
and for the maturity of the technology in the market using the modal citation lag.   
As discussed above, we also present “differences-in-differences” estimates that make use 
of the fact that the expansion of software patentability took place at different times for different 
types of software.  Though driven to some extent by pressure from patent applicants, arguably 
these changes are exogenous to the extent of the patent thicket in a particular market.  Briefly, 
these regime changes were as follows.  In 1972, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Gottschalk v. 
Benson held that because software is essentially a collection of algorithms, it could not be 
patented. However, in 1982 in the Diamond v. Diehr ruling, the court allowed for patenting of 
software tied to physical or mechanical processes, such as the program implemented in the 
method for curing rubber at issue in the case. While patents were granted during the 1980s for 
inventions with a substantial software component, and the distinction between patentable and 
non-patentable subject matter in this area was progressively shifted and weakened by various 
court decisions and creative drafting of patent claims, the effectiveness of patent protection for 
software was far from clear, with many leading software companies filing only limited numbers 
of applications, or eschewing software patents altogether.  This uncertainty was resolved in the 
mid 1990s, when the 1994 Federal Circuit decision In re Alappat drew a definitive distinction 
between unpatentable software in the form of “a disembodied mathematical concept…which in 
essence represents nothing more than a ‘law of nature,’ ‘natural phenomenon,’ or ‘abstract idea’” 
and patentable software that is “rather a specific machine to produce a useful, concrete, and 
tangible result.”
21  A series of further court decisions in 1994 and 1995 following Alappat 
culminated in a new set of guidelines, issued by the Commissioner of Patents in May of 1996, 
                                                 
21 In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994), quoted in Sterne and Bugaisky, p. 222   24
which allowed inventors to patent any software embodied in physical media.
22  Further 
expansion of software patentability came in 1998 with the State Street Bank & Trust vs. 
Signature Financial Corp. (“State Street”) decision, which eliminated the requirement that the 
software algorithm be tied to a “physical transformation.” 
As a result of this evolution of legal and administrative doctrine over the 1980s and 90s, 
some categories of software patents became more clearly obtainable, and more easily 
enforceable before others.  While, software used in manufacturing or “embedded” in hardware 
devices was covered prior to the 1996 change in guidelines, software more generally was 
covered after 1996, and financial or business methods software became clearly patentable after 
State Street in 1998.  The markets in our sample fall into three groups that were affected by these 
“regime changes” at different times: those for which software was patentable before 1996 
(manufacturing software), those for which it became patentable in 1996 (other types of software 
not including those affected by State Street), and those for whom patentability increased in 1998 
(financial software and internet-related software).  Using the standard differences-in-differences 
specification, we therefore we include in the regression the log of the number of patents in a 
market, the regime-change dummy, and the interaction of the latter two variables.  The 
coefficient on this interaction term gives the change in the effect of the market’s patents on the 
dependent various following the expansion of the strength of patents that are relevant to the 
market.  Figure 3 shows the average number of patents granted in each market, grouped by the 
applicable regime change.  As the figure shows, changes in the volume of patenting and the 
timing of these changes behave quite differently across the three groups, reflecting the 
differential impact of the regime changes in 1996 and 1998.  Group 1, the set of software 
markets characterized by manufacturing applications, shows a stable increase over time. Group 
                                                 
22 Sterne and Bugaisky, p. 223   25
2, the set we classify as primarily affected by the legal decisions following Alappat and the 
change in USPTO guidelines as of 1996, see a dramatic jump after 1996 followed by a return to 
trend. Markets in the third group, which were affected by Alappat but also by State Street in 
1998, see an increase after 1996 and continue to grow until 2000, when the USPTO began 
performing more rigorous examinations of business methods patents (the “second pair of eyes”).  
This change would seem to account for the dip in the number of patents granted in group 3 after 
2000. 
Figure 3: Patents granted by year and type of software 
 
Group 1: Automatic teller machine software, Robotic software, Quality control software, Peripheral device drivers 
Group 2: Voice technology software, Natural language software, Neural network software, Fax software, Internet tools, Wide 
area network software, Local area network software, File management software, Hierarchical DBMS software, Relational DBMS 
software, Database query language software, 3D representation software, Electronic message systems software, Desktop 
publishing software, Artificial intelligence R&D, Geographic information systems software, Disaster recovery software, 
Security/auditing software, Performance measuring software 
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Patents and entry 
Table 6 reports coefficient estimates from Poisson regressions on the number of entrants 
in each market-year.  Standard errors are clustered by market.  Column (1) of Table 6 confirms 
the findings reported in Cockburn and MacGarvie (1997)—after controlling for market structure, 
demand etc, the number of patents in force in the market has a substantial negative and 
significant effect on the number of entrants with an elasticity of -0.438.  In Column (2) we 
include measures of uncertainty about the scope of patent rights, and the negative and significant 
coefficient on the number of claims per patent citation suggests that markets in which there are a 
preponderance of such “problem patents” see less entry.  Column (3) of Table 6 gives the 
“differences-in-differences” estimates.  Interestingly, there was an overall increase in entry 
following the regime change (see the positive and significant coefficient on the dummy 
indicating a market was post-regime-change).  However, the negative and significant coefficient 
on the interaction term indicates that markets with more patents saw larger reductions in entry 
following the regime change when compared with other post-regime-change markets with fewer 
patents as well as pre-regime-change markets.  In columns (3) and (4) we report results estimated 
separately for “de novo” entrants versus “diversifiers” (entry into new product markets by firms 
that are already established in other markets.  The marked difference in the estimated coefficients 
on the number of patents in force and on the interaction term suggest that these negative effect of 
patent thickets on entry is largely driven by the impact on the de novo entrants. 
This finding is provocative because it suggests that small, specialized firms are more 
affected by increases in the strength of IP rights than established firms.  One mechanism through 
which this effect may operate is the financing of early-stage firms. If increases in barriers to   27
entry reduce the expected profitability of entrants, they will also reduce their attractiveness to 
investors and may make it more difficult for de novo entrants to raise capital. 
Note that coefficient on the interaction term (the “treatment effect” from strengthening patent 
rights in the market) is the average treatment effect measured in terms of elasticities.  Though it 
is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level, this coefficient conceals substantial 
differences in the marginal “treatment effect” measured in numbers of entrants computed for 




th percentiles of the market size distribution.
23  As Figure 4 shows, while the 
estimated marginal interaction effects are all negative, some are quite small and not statistically 
distinguishable form zero.  As Figure 4 also shows, there appears to be a relationship between 
the magnitude of marginal interaction effects and market size that is not fully captured by the 
control variables in the regression.  Larger marginal effects tend to be found in markets with 
more incumbent firms, suggesting a more complex relationship between the patent landscape and 
competition than is captured by this simple regression model.   
 
 
                                                 
23 These effects were obtained by calculating the pre- and post-regime change difference in the partial derivative 
with respect to the log of patents in the market, using Stata’s predictnl command. This command computes standard 
errors via the delta method.   28
Figure 4:  
Marginal effect of interaction of regime change dummy and the log of 
































































Patents and initial funding 
Turning to the impact of patent thickets on financing, the first two columns of Table 7a 
present results from Poisson regressions on the number of new ventures receiving their first 
round of financing from external investors.
24  As before, standard errors are clustered by market, 
and all regressions have market and year fixed effects.  The dependent variable is the number of 
firms in market j who have not previously received external financing and who obtain such 
investment for the first time in year t.  (The following section describes in greater detail how this 
indicator is constructed, and performs a comprehensive analysis of the probability a firm receives 
                                                 
24  See the discussion of firm level results below for details on the construction of this variable.   29
initial investment by a given year. Here we present a preview of these findings by examining the 
broad market-level patterns in initial financing episode and patenting in the market.) 
The number of firms in a market receiving investment for the first time in year t will 
depend on a) the number of firms “at risk” (i.e. the number of early stage firms that haven’t 
previously received investment), b) the stage of development of firms in the market (the average 
age of the firms), and c) the expected profitability of the entrants.  We use the same variables as 
in the entry regressions to control for demand and market structure, but also include a count of 
the number of firms “at risk” which is the total number of new ventures identified as being 
present in the previous sample year. 
In column (1) the coefficient on the number of patents in force is large and negative, 
implying that software ventures that enter markets with larger patent thickets see are less likely 
to receive funding from outside investors.  In this regression the estimated coefficient is only 
marginally significant, though when the market structure variables are excluded the estimated 
coefficient is -1.07 and strongly significant.  In column (2) we use the differences-in-differences 
specification, and here a large and strongly significant coefficient is estimated on both the 
dummy for change in regime and the interaction term.  We conclude that patent-intensive 
markets saw a reduction in initial investment by external parties in early-stage firms relative to 
low-patent markets following the expansion of software patentability in the 1990s. 
In Table 7b we include measures of the uncertainty of patent rights.  As can be seen in 
columns (1) and (2) these have little effect on the result for number of patents in force, but we 
find a negative and significant effect on entry of the mean share of non-patent references in the 
citations made by patents in the market.  (In the differences-in-differences specification in 
column (2) the estimated coefficient is larger and more significant.  In specifications where we   30
include interaction terms with the uncertainty variables they are not significant.)  This result is 
consistent with idea that markets in which patents have relatively more references to the 
technical literature—i.e. are more clearly distinguished from the prior art, and perhaps more 
likely to be held valid—appear to make new ventures less attractive to outside investors.   
 
Patents and funding levels 
Columns (3) and (4) of Tables 7a and 7b report regression results where the dependent 
variable is the amount of financing received by firms active in each market in year.  Here we use 
the log of the median amount invested across all transactions in a given market/year as the 
dependent variable.  When we use the log of the total amount invested in all transactions (or try 
to model the amount received by each venture in a firm-level regression) the regression performs 
very poorly.  We believe that this reflects the very high level of measurement error in the amount 
of financing received at the transaction level, which creates some very large and influential 
outliers, as well as difficulties in adequately capturing heterogeneity across different rounds and 
unobserved aspects of individual transactions.   
In Table 7b we find the opposite “main effect” of patent thickets on funding levels than 
was the case for the volume of entry: the coefficient on the number of patents in the market is 
positive and significant, with an elasticity around +1.  We attribute this to a strong 
selection/threshold effect, whereby the higher entry costs associated with patent thickets result in 
smaller firms requiring lower amounts of external investment being denied funding.  As before, 
however, the “treatment effect” of strengthening patent rights is negative and significant: relative 
to markets with fewer patents in force, strengthening patent rights in markets with a large thicket 
results in a leftwards shift in the distribution of external investments in software ventures.  The   31
uncertainty variables (columns (3) and (4) of Table 7b) have no significant effect on funding 
amounts, and controlling for these subtler aspects of the patent landscape in each market has 
little impact on the estimated effect of the number of patents in force.   
 
Patents and IPOs 
Finally, columns (5) and (6) in Tables 7a and 7b present results from a Poisson regression 
on the number of IPOs in each market/year.  Consistent with patent thickets being, on net, 
beneficial to incumbent firms in Table 7b we find a large, positive main effect of the number of 
patents, but with a negative and significant interaction term.  Relative to markets with fewer 
patents, strengthening patent rights in markets with a large number of patents in force appears to 
make software enterprises less attractive to investors in public markets.  However the very large 
positive coefficient estimated on the regime change dummy points to possible difficulties in 
identifying this effect separately from other factors affecting IPOs.  For example, the “tech 
stock” bubble of the late 1990s is somewhat coincident with the changes in legal regime.  We 
experimented with using the level of the NASDAQ index and the book-to-market ratio in the 
ICT industry as control variables but found that their inclusion did not substantially alter the 
main findings and we concluded that the influence of aggregate forces such as these were better 
captured by the year dummies included in these regressions.  
Including the uncertainty measures in these regressions (columns (5) and (6) of Table 7b) 
has a substantial impact on the estimated effect of the number of patents.  The coefficients lose 
significance, while the estimated effect of the uncertainty measures are large and significant.  
Taken at face value, the estimates suggest that investors in public markets are less willing to 
invest in firms operating in markets where there are more “problem patents” with a high ratio of   32
claims to citations made, but more willing to invest in firms operating in markets where the 
average patent cites a larger amount of technical literature as opposed to other patents. 
 
 
II. Impact of patent thickets at the firm level 
 
The market level results, though provocative, do not permit any investigation of our other 
hypotheses about the effect of uncertainty about patent-related costs being to delay investment.  
By looking at firm-level data, we can measure the timing of investments and test for any impact 
of patent thickets and our other measures of uncertainty about the scope of patent rights.  We can 
also control for the degree to which investors concerns about patent thickets are mitigated by 
new ventures holding their own patents.  (See Gans, Hsu, and Stern.)  Cockburn and MacGarvie 
(2007) find a substantial positive effect of own patent holdings on the probability of entry into a 
market, suggesting that this may also be an important factor in funding decisions. 
 
Receipt of initial funding from VCs and corporate investors 
As discussed above we hypothesize that, if patent thickets reduce a venture’s expected 
profits, investors faced with two otherwise identical companies will choose the one operating in 
a less “thicketed” market.   
In order to test this hypothesis, we would ideally have a dataset comprised of firms that 
sought external funding and were either granted or denied such funding.  While this type of data 
is very difficult to find, we have created what we believe to be a reasonable approximation of 
such a dataset using a sub-sample of firms extracted from the CorpTech directory.  CorpTech 
lists more than 19,000 software companies active at some point between 1992 and 2004, but is   33
unlikely to capture the entire population of software firms.  To the extent that firms that appear 
on CorpTech have passed some threshold of success that warrants their inclusion in the 
directory, our sample may not be entirely representative of the universe of entrepreneurial 
companies.  Inference based on firm-level census data would allow for unbiased estimates of the 
effects of patent thickets on investment in early stage firms. Lacking such data, our estimates 
may therefore provide a lower bound for the effects of interest.  
From the CorpTech sample we select firms founded in 1990 or later that are active in no 
more than one of our 27 product classes. For firms that appear in CorpTech more than one year 
after being founded, we extrapolate the firm-level data on firm size backwards.  We eliminate 
firms that have already gone public or been acquired.  
CorpTech reports the initial source(s) of capital for the firm, for all smaller firms founded 
between 1992 and 2002. This variable allows us to construct a database comprised of firms that 
obtain funding at an early stage from venture capitalists or corporate investors and firms that do 
not obtain such funding. We use CorpTech to identify the set of firms that did and did not 
receive funding, and we use VentureXpert to identify the timing of first investment. Kaplan, 
Sensoy and Stromberg (2002) show that VentureXpert omits 15% of financing rounds and 20% 
of financing committed. To ensure that we do not mistakenly classify firms that receive external 
funding but are not listed on VentureXpert, we drop from the sample 290 firms that are listed on 
CorpTech as having VC or corporate investment prior to 2002 but that do not appear on 
VentureXpert. We also drop firms for which no information is available from CorpTech on 
initial sources of capital.  We are left with a sample of 951 firms, of which 475 receive external 
funding for the first time between 1992 and 2002.   34
Using information on the first round of investment from VentureXpert, we create a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i receives venture or corporate financing for the first time in 
year t, 0 before year t, and missing after year t. This variable takes on a value of zero in all years 
for firms that never receive funding before 2002. We then perform duration analysis using the 
Cox Proportional Hazard model.
25   
Figure 5a gives the Kaplan-Meier survival curves estimated from these data for firms 
grouped by where their target market falls in the distribution of the numbers of patents in force.  
(Here “survival” means failure to attract outside funding.)   
Figure 5a:   
Kaplan-Meier Estimates of Survival Functions for the Hazard  


























There is no obvious difference across these groups, but once the survival functions are 
adjusted for the size of the market (number of incumbents and number of incumbents squared, 
                                                 
25 Essentially similar results are obtained using logit Discrete-Time Hazard models.   35
we see quite striking differences in the impact of patent thickets.
26  As can be seen in Figure 5b, 
the Kaplan-Meier estimates show that software ventures in the most thicketed markets have a 
very small probability of obtaining outside funding, while there are marked differences in the 
survival curves across markets corresponding to differences in the quartiles in the patenting 
distribution, with the likelihood of funding at any given duration falling as we move from lower 
to higher percentiles (after adjusting for market size). 
Figure 5b:   
Kaplan-Meier Estimates of Survival Functions for the Hazard of Obtaining  




























These results show the importance of controlling for market characteristics, and in the 
hazard models, our explanatory variables include year and product market fixed effects, and the 
modal citation lag for patents in the market.  Other market-level controls relating to profitability 
                                                 
26 These graphs were created using Stata’s sts graph command, which estimates separate Cox regressions for each 
percentile group. Adjusting for the number of incumbents means that the number of incumbents and the number of 
incumbents squared were included as covariates in the Cox regression.   36
in the firm’s target market include the number of incumbents in the market and the number of 
incumbents squared, and the growth of sales in the market.
27  Variables relating to the patent 
landscape include the log of the patent stock in the market and the Herfindahl over assignees of 
citations made by patents in the market.
28  Firm-level explanatory variables include the 
aforementioned dummies for firm size range, implicitly the age of the firm (since the “duration” 
variable is years since the birth of the firm), and the number of patents granted and pending. 
Table 8 contains results from these regressions, reported as hazard ratios.  Looking at the 
control variables, relative to baseline, the hazard of receiving funding is significantly higher (and 
thus delays in funding are shorter) in faster growing markets.  In general the hazard of funding is 
nonlinearly related to the number of competitors in the market, with an initial increase and then 
decrease, first rising with the this measure of the size of the market—presumably reflecting an 
increase in expected profits due to a reduction in the market power of incumbents or a reduction 
of barriers to entry created by network effects—then falling as the number of incumbents 
increases, which could reflect the fact that large numbers of incumbents indicate more mature, 
more crowded, and less attractive markets.  The dummies for the range of firm size (not reported, 
but available upon request) display a concave relationship between firm size and the hazard of 
initial funding.  These results are somewhat sensitive to the selection of control variables, but 
adding or dropping control variables has little effect on the estimated coefficients on the patent 
variables. 
                                                 
27 The inclusion of a proxy for the CR4 of sales in the market was rejected by a likelihood ratio test. The same is true 
of the log of the number of forward citations per patent in the market. 
28 This is computed by taking patents associated with a given market (SOF) in application year t, and calculating the 
share of their backward citations received by each of a set of assignees. Assignee names were cleaned using a 
combination of an algorithm and manual inspection. Backward citations to patents granted no more than ten years 
previously are omitted.   37
The “patent landscape” variables display a pattern consistent with several of our 
hypotheses.  In all of the regressions, increases in the total number of patents in the market are 
associated with a substantial and statistically significant reduction in the hazard of receiving 
funding (or, equivalently, longer delays in receiving funding).  Conversely, we find a positive 
and significant effect on the hazard of receiving funding for software ventures that have their 
own patents.  Consistent with the idea that investors are forward-looking (and with anecdotal 
evidence) a much larger and statistically significant effect is found for the number of patents 
pending than for the number of patents granted.  
In column (2), the differences-in-differences specification shows that the negative effect 
of patent thickets is larger in markets where patent rights were strengthened relative to those 
where it was not.  Comparing columns (1) and (2) with (3) through (5), a one standard deviation 
increase in the number of patents in the market is associated with a reduction in the hazard of 
being funded on average of 0.01 (one percentage point).   After 1996, this increases to 
approximately a reduction in the hazard of funding by 0.04 for a one standard deviation increase 
in the patent stock in the market.  Given that the mean probability of obtaining funding in a given 
year is 0.085 overall and 0.102 after 1996, this effect appears to be of considerable importance. 
The significance of these results are robust to clustering at the market level.  The “average 
treatment effect” implied by the interaction term is statistically significant.  However, though the 
marginal effect computed for each observation is always negative, it is not always significant.  
Table 8 gives the average marginal interaction effect, and the average standard error, estimated 
from a logit discrete-time version of the Cox continuous time model.
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29 These marginal effects are again computed using Stata’s predictnl command.  See Ai and Norton (2003) for more 
on the estimation of interaction terms in nonlinear discrete choice models.   38
Comparing estimates using the full sample of data to those obtained for the sub-sample of 
observations after 1996 (the major shift in the legal regime governing software patentability) 
shows that the impact of patent thickets was much larger during this period.  Consistent with the 
quite large negative interaction term effect in column (2), the hazard of receiving funding is 
substantially lower for this subsample than for the full sample.  The marginal effect of the 
number of patents in force is almost four times larger after 1996 than for the full sample. 
Column (4) of Table 8 reports results from including measures of bargaining costs.  In 
Cockburn and MacGarvie (2007) we found that these had a significant effect on entry.  (We 
report results only for the post-1996 subsample.  Coefficients were insignificant but of the same 
sign and similar magnitude when the same specification was used on the full sample.)  
Consistent with the hypotheses about bargaining costs and the concentration of patent ownership 
discussed above, we find a positive effect of the Herfindahl of patent citations over assignees 
within each market on the hazard of receiving initial funding.  In other words, an initial round of 
funding by external investors is more likely to be obtained by software ventures operating in 
markets were IP ownership is more concentrated.  Our alternative measure of bargaining costs, a 
quadratic in the number of cited assignees, is insignificant.   
 
Exits  
Table 9 presents results of a model of the probability that a new venture ultimately exits 
from the “entrepreneurial phase” by going public, being acquired by another firm, or is 
liquidated or truncated in the dataset.  The unit of observation for this analysis is a calendar year, 
and we use a competing risks discrete time hazard model in which we use a multinomial logit for 
probability of each of these mutually exclusive outcomes being observed in each year.  The   39
dependent variable is equal to 0 in each year prior to exit via IPO or acquisition, 1 in the year 
that the firm goes public, and 2 when the firm exits via acquisition.  Firms that are censored or 
liquidated take on a value of zero in all periods.  (Competing risks can be estimated using this 
type of multinomial logit model provided the competing risks are independent, see Allison 
(1982).)  The market-level variables are as described above.  We also include controls for 
characteristics of the investors in each venture (total patents held by investors, the number of 
investments from corporate investors as opposed to VCs, and the cumulative number of IPOs by 
firms in which investors had previously invested) and of the venture itself (total amount invested 
to date, and number of patents held.) The sample is restricted to firms from the sample used in 
the initial funding regressions that received at least one round of funding. Characteristics of 
investors are measured only in years in which the firm receives a round of investment, and a 
dummy variable is included to indicate years in which the firm received investment.
30  
Consistent with the market level results on IPOs, the multinomial logit regressions 
reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table 9 indicate that the hazard of going public or being 
acquired is higher in markets with more patents, though the coefficient is not significant.  We 
also find that the hazard of exiting from the sample in these ways is increasing in the number of 
patents owned by the venture (a strongly significant effect) and increasing in the total amount of 
outside investment to date (though only marginally significant.) 
In the differences-in-differences specification in columns (3) and (4) we also obtain a 
result consistent with the market-level findings: a significant positive effect of the number of 
patents in the market on the probability of exiting via IPO, although the interaction effect with 
the legal regime change is negative.  Again, we interpret this as evidence that patent thickets tend 
                                                 
30 The coefficient on this variable is not reported but is available upon request. We also estimated models in which 
an observation was a firm-round, rather than a firm-year, and obtained comparable results.   40
to protect incumbents, but only up to a point.  When patents are strengthened by changes in the 
legal regime, the effect is smaller (though not significantly so).  The effect on the hazard of 
exiting via acquisition is negative, but not significant, and because the data are ill-conditioned 
(due to sparse cell counts) we are unable to obtain stable estimates of the regime dummy 
interaction effect for the exit via acquisition outcome.  The impact of patent thickets is very 
apparent when we estimate the model on the subset of firms that did not obtain any patents of 
their own.  As can be seen in columns (5) and (6), these firms are much less likely to exit via 
IPO, relative either to liquidation/censoring or to acquisition, in markets with a large patent 
thicket.  This finding is striking in light of the fact that only a minority of the firms in our sample 
( 22%) hold patents by the time of exit. An important question for future research is why, given 
the apparent differences in success rates between patent-holding and non-patent holding firms, 
relatively few firms in these markets filed patents during this time period. 
 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
 
The impact of stronger intellectual property rights in the software industry is 
controversial.  One often under-emphasized means by which patents can affect technical change, 
industry dynamics, and ultimately welfare, is through their role in stimulating or stifling entry by 
new ventures.  The mechanisms through which patents can impact this process are, as ever, 
complex.  Patents can block entry, or raise entrants’ costs in variety of ways, while at the same 
time they may stimulate entry by improving the bargaining position of entrants vis-à-vis 
incumbents, and supporting a “market for technology” which enables new ventures to license 
their way into the market, or realize value through trade in their intangible assets.  Some of the   41
impact of patent thickets may therefore be felt in the interaction of new ventures with the capital 
markets, and here we find evidence that the extraordinary growth in patenting of software has 
had a variety of effects on the financing of software companies.   
Our analysis of an unusually complete data set that contains information on software 
ventures that do not obtain outside funding as well as those that do attract VC and corporate 
investments provides evidence that patents significantly affect the likelihood of obtaining 
funding for early-stage firms.  Interestingly, the number of a firm’s patents pending is positively 
and significantly related to the probability a firm obtains initial funding, while the number of 
patents already granted is not—outside investors appear to be focused on these firms’ “pipeline” 
of IP assets under development. . The estimated effect is quite large: each additional patent 
pending increases the hazard of funding by around 10%.  Start-up software companies operating 
in markets characterized by denser patent thickets see their initial acquisition of VC or corporate 
funding delayed relative to firms in markets less affected by patents.  This effect does not appear 
to be present on average once funding has been obtained and new ventures have become 
incumbents.  If anything, our market-level estimates of the conditional correlation between the 
number of IPOs in a market and the patents in force there suggest that firms operating in markets 
with a large number of patents may be more attractive to investors in public markets, stimulating 
IPO activity and thus the payoff to early-stage investors.  We do however find that changes in the 
legal regime that strengthen patent rights significantly lower the correlation between patents in a 
market and the number of IPOs.  In a firm-level analysis that controls for additional 
characteristics of pre-IPO firms, these results are maintained, but they are statistically weak (the 
estimated coefficients are have the same sign but rarely significant) and again the effect only 
works up to a point.  Interestingly, we find a significant negative correlation between the hazard   42
of going public and the number of patents in a market for the start-up firms that do not 
themselves hold patents. Firms without patents operating in thicketed markets are also 
significantly more likely to be acquired than to have an IPO.  Measures of uncertainty about of 
the scope and validity of patents also appear to play a role in investment decisions, though our 
results are less robust.  We find that there is less entry into markets where patents have a higher 
ratio of claims made to the amount of prior cited.  We also find a statistically significant 
association between our measures of patent-related uncertainty and the number of IPOs in a 
market in a given year.  Investors in public securities appear to be more willing to invest in 
software companies operating in markets in which there are fewer “problem patents” and in 
which patents cite more non-patent prior art.  However we find no evidence for our hypothesized 
relationship between higher levels of uncertainty and delays in the timing of initial financing of 
new software companies by venture capitalists and corporate investors.   
One of the most statistically robust (and provocative) findings of this paper is the 
importance of new ventures obtaining their own patents.  Firms that have higher numbers of 
patents and patent applications pending are more likely to receive funding from outside 
investors, and more likely to subsequently “exit” from the entrepreneurial phase through IPO or 
acquisition.  These findings may in part reflect the value to outside investors of the ability to 
obtain patents as signal of the quality of a new venture’s technology and/or management.  Hsu 
and Ziedonis (2007) show that larger numbers of patent applications are associated with higher 
valuations of early stage semiconductor companies, and attribute this in part to factors other than 
the information about a firm’s technology that is provided by patents.  Beyond this “capabilities” 
argument, we suggest that when faced with a patent thicket, patents also confer significant 
competitive advantages on entrant firms in minimizing transactions costs associated with   43
incumbents’ patent holdings.  But despite these facts, only 16% of the firms in our regression 
sample (and only 22% of the firms that ultimately got funding) ever filed for a patent during our 
sample period.  If the benefits from holding patents are as substantial as our results suggest, it is 
puzzling why more of the firms that were active in these markets during this period did not 
obtain them.  One explanation may be that causality between funding and patent applications 
runs in the opposite direction: it may be that investors require early stage firms to file patent 
applications as a condition of receiving funds, or that applications are observed 
disproportionately by firms that get funding and are more able to support the substantial costs of 
patent prosecution.  In these data we only observe applications that are subsequently granted, so 
this may be a significant source of bias if large numbers of unobserved applications are 
abandoned by firms who are not funded.   
This paper documents a number of mechanisms through which patents confer private 
benefits to software companies.  These benefits appear to have been substantial, and are reflected 
in the extraordinary surge in patenting in this industry.  However these incentives to obtain 
patents may ultimately become collectively self-destructive.  Our differences-in-differences 
estimates of the relative impact of strengthening patent rights show a generally negative effect on 
entry and financing of software firms in the most heavily thicketed markets.  Continued 
accumulation of patents may therefore result in the “stifling” effects identified here swamping 
the offsetting “stimulating” effect on innovation.   44
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Table 1a: Number of firms per market – mean by firm type and year 
 




Share of new 
entrants  
VC-funded 
Share of new entrants
Corporate-funded 
1994 82.63  9.81  8.89  0.93 0.04  0.04 
1996 109.22  15.74  13.30  2.44  0.14  0.02 
1998 132.00  19.07  16.74  2.33  0.12  0.05 
2000 176.59  13.74  12.22  1.52  0.17  0.04 
2002 200.85  7.81  4.41  3.41  0.26  0.09 
2004 243.48  23.41  20.93  2.48  0.25  0.11 




Table 1b: Number of firms per market – mean by firm type and SOF 
 




Share of new 
entrants  
VC-funded 
Share of new entrants 
Corporate-funded 
ac_b   489.83  24.67  21.00  3.67  0.11  0.08 
ac_t   117.00  6.33  6.17  0.17  0.00  0.00 
ai_a   73.50  7.00  6.33  0.67  0.17  0.00 
ai_l   13.50  2.00  1.33  0.67  0.08  0.08 
ai_n   17.00  2.00  1.67  0.33  0.00  0.00 
ba_a   25.00  1.67  1.33  0.33  0.17  0.00 
cs_f   88.17  12.50  10.83  1.67  0.04  0.00 
cs_i   377.67  51.17  40.67  10.50  0.34  0.14 
cs_l   142.00  13.00  11.17  1.83  0.21  0.04 
cs_w   67.83  9.83  9.00  0.83  0.25  0.08 
Dm_f   373.00  44.17  38.67  5.50  0.21  0.13 
dm_mh 39.83  4.00  3.33  0.67 0.17  0.08 
dm_mr 167.17  12.67  10.50  2.17  0.13  0.04 
dm_q   103.00  16.17  14.33  1.83  0.25  0.08 
ma_c   12.17  1.00  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
ma_q   74.33  17.00  15.33  1.67  0.08  0.00 
oa_gd 121.00 10.00  7.83  2.17 0.26  0.17 
oa_me 142.17 15.33 12.67  2.67 0.28  0.18 
oa_p   51.33  4.50  3.67  0.83  0.17  0.00 
sv_ar 34.00 0.83 0.83  0.00  0.00  0.00 
ts_er 109.67  9.33  8.50  0.83  0.04  0.00 
ut_h   80.17  7.33  7.00  0.33  0.08  0.00 
ut_r   54.17  7.67  6.67  1.00  0.33  0.17 
ut_x   279.00  28.33  23.33  5.00  0.39  0.14 
ut_y   192.00  28.67  23.33  5.33  0.24  0.05 
Wd_i   593.50  35.33  31.17  4.17  0.11  0.00 
wd_o   413.50  30.67  26.50  4.17  0.28  0.06 
All 157.46  14.93  12.75  2.19  0.16  0.06 
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Table 2a: Market Characteristics – by year 
 
Year 






1994 316  0.73  3.15 
1996 461  0.71  4.15 
1998 662  0.68  5.37 
2000 4,825  0.50  6.04 
2002 1,903  0.59  7.30 
2004 2,025  0.50  7.70 
All 1,699  0.62  5.62 
 
 









ac_b   2,073  0.34  5.33 
ac_t   853  0.66  3.50 
ai_a   1,138  0.66  6.50 
ai_l   254  0.95  7.17 
ai_n   219  0.93  7.17 
ba_a   465  0.80  5.33 
cs_f   867  0.62  4.67 
cs_i   6,577  0.28  4.67 
cs_l   3,610  0.50  4.67 
cs_w   1,357  0.67  4.67 
dm_f   3,550  0.30  5.00 
dm_mh 266  0.86  5.50 
dm_mr 2,160  0.53  5.50 
dm_q   1,302  0.54  5.50 
ma_c   68  0.95  5.50 
ma_q   723  0.62  6.00 
oa_gd 1,842  0.61  4.67 
oa_me 1,371  0.50  6.00 
oa_p   528  0.72  6.50 
sv_ar 1,324  0.92  5.33 
ts_er 1,761  0.70  4.50 
ut_h   1,410  0.73  4.33 
ut_r   805  0.68  5.67 
ut_x   4,366  0.45  7.00 
ut_y   2,729  0.54  6.33 
wd_i   2,692  0.29  7.50 
wd_o   1,554  0.36  7.17 
All 1,699  0.62  5.62 
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Table 3: Patent Counts by year 
 
Year Grants Applications  Expirations  Total  patents 
in force 
1980 366  680  .  2359 
1981 394  755  .  2987 
1982 491  859  .  3797 
1983 552  860  .  4659 
1984 739  861  .  5870 
1985 851  920  .  7307 
1986 873  1096  .  8759 
1987 1091  1363  .  10557 
1988 1076  1567  .  12296 
1989 1632  1856  .  14900 
1990 1463  2116  .  17272 
1991 1595  2237  .  19816 
1992 1735  2569  .  22882 
1993 2095  2805  .  26702 
1994 2400  3738 439  31162 
1995 2688  5694 774  35775 
1996 3497  7032 734  41892 
1997 3676  8693  1049  48219 
1998 6706  9523 974  61406 
1999 7149  10753  1290  75457 
2000 7049  12270  1259  88718 
2001 7561  11634  1435  102808 
2002 7777  9200  1795  118032 
2003 8219  5121  2091  133597 
2004 9123  2070  2131  150981 
2005 10781  590 2017  169093 
2006 16285  36 2669  199191 
All 107864  108898  18660   
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Table 4a: Patent Characteristics – by year 
 
Grant Year  # Patents 
Granted 
Mean #  
of claims 
Mean # of US 
patents cited 
Mean # Foreign 
patents cited 
Mean # non- 
patent 
references 
Mean # forward 
cites within  
5 years 
1977 382  12.35 6.06  0.03  0.27  4.07 
1978 351  14.15 5.98  0.04  0.35  4.03 
1979 266  12.24 6.26  0.12  0.50  4.02 
1980 366  12.65 6.79  0.18  0.49  4.87 
1981 394  12.39 7.24  0.25  0.58  4.85 
1982 491  12.54 7.37  0.32  0.68  5.24 
1983 552  12.69 7.35  0.42  0.73  5.58 
1984 739  11.93 7.24  0.38  1.00  6.19 
1985 851  11.70 7.51  0.41  0.78  6.35 
1986 873  11.85 7.38  0.58  0.79  5.84 
1987 1091  11.63  7.54  0.41  0.86  6.86 
1988 1076  12.18  7.57  0.61  1.16  6.17 
1989 1632  13.56  8.18  0.86  1.34  6.38 
1990 1463  13.47  8.36  0.76  1.69  6.45 
1991 1595  13.40  7.96  0.75  1.50  6.73 
1992 1735  14.45  8.92  0.94  2.08  7.85 
1993 2095  14.50  8.56  0.95  2.07  9.06 
1994 2400  14.58  8.91  1.05  2.40  9.67 
1995 2688  14.52  9.66  1.11  2.32  9.53 
1996 3497  16.01 10.76  1.20  3.03  10.87 
1997 3676  17.13 11.35  1.18  3.72  10.77 
1998 6706  18.89 11.48  1.27  3.53  10.81 
1999 7149  20.44 12.23  1.29  4.03  10.54 
2000 7049  20.95 12.83  1.19  4.05  9.44 
2001 7561  20.76 14.22  1.53  4.22  9.34 
2002 7777  22.10 13.76  1.57  4.06  . 
2003 8219  22.38 14.82  1.66  4.28  . 
2004 9123  22.84 14.95  1.61  4.08  . 
2005 10781  22.79  16.00  1.99  5.34  . 
2006 16285  22.44  19.11  2.21  6.98  . 
All 108863  19.79  13.44  1.47  4.09  9.12 
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Table 4b: Patent Characteristics by Market 
 
SOF Total  # 
Patents 
Granted 
CAGR of # 
patents in force 
1980-2006 
Mean #  
of claims 
Mean # of 
US patents 
cited 
Mean # of 
Foreign 
patents cited 
Mean # of 
non-patent 
references 
Mean # of 
forward cites  
within 5 years 
ac_b   189  21.6%  26.06  17.48  2.07  17.17  16.79 
ac_t    41  14.0%  17.24  9.85 0.63 6.59 4.36 
ai_a    8385  16.1%  19.64  9.98 1.22 4.68 6.63 
ai_l    2981  13.8%  19.09  10.00 1.32 4.10 6.29 
ai_n   1482  26.5%  19.24  10.65  0.93  10.11  6.40 
ba_a    1242  15.7%  19.36  18.88 2.38 2.59 8.64 
cs_f    13629  25.5%  22.36  17.52 1.35 4.98  15.32 
cs_i    13629  25.5%  22.36  17.52 1.35 4.98  15.32 
cs_l    13629  25.5%  22.36  17.52 1.35 4.98  15.32 
cs_w   13629  25.5% 22.36  17.52  1.35  4.98  15.32 
dm_f    8943  22.1%  22.81  13.30 0.92 5.36  13.41 
dm_mh  10169  219%  23.54  13.46 0.92 5.60  13.21 
dm_mr  10169  21.9%  23.54  13.46 0.92 5.60  13.21 
dm_q    10169  21.9%  23.54  13.46 0.92 5.60  13.21 
ma_c    1055  16.8%  17.38  13.84 2.09 4.53 6.37 
ma_q    332  31.2%  20.51  13.37 1.57 2.28 7.70 
ma_tc  16809  13.7%  17.56  10.98 1.01 2.40 7.09 
oa_gd  6057  15.5%  19.20  10.62 1.66 3.51 6.20 
oa_me  742  31.5%  23.45  18.38 1.49 5.64  18.68 
oa_mv  724  12.7%  16.82  9.84 3.48 1.89 6.57 
oa_p    3126  18,7%  20.29  13.64 1.06 5.08 9.75 
sv_ar  2261  28.5%  20.05  10.51 0.86 9.48 6.86 
ts_er  13445  16.1%  16.82  12.00 2.16 1.33 7.39 
ut_2    1166  21.2%  23.59  12.13 0.75 5.00  11.65 
ut_h    13164  14.8%  17.59  13.18 1.01 2.08 8.34 
ut_o    12508  22.4%  23.32  13.62 0.94 5.50  13.09 
ut_r    15536  14.7%  18.73  13.63 1.07 2.77 9.50 
ut_x    3092  22.5%  23.32  18.83 2.72 8.42  14.75 
ut_y    16811  13.7%  17.56  10.98 1.01 2.39 7.09 
wd_i    1681  19.0%  20.02  16.50 1.84 3.77 9.26 
wd_o    5076  20.1%  23.66  17.94 2.15 8.84  13.00 
All  227684    20.69  14.01 1.28 4.38  10.53 
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Table 5a: Thicket Measures – by year 
 
year  # of claims per  
patent citation 
Mean # of non-
patent references 




CR4 of  
citations  
1994 2.29  2.09  189.96  0.05  0.34 
1996 2.11  2.66  331.65  0.05  0.33 
1998 2.04  3.26  564.78  0.04  0.29 
2000 2.16  4.67  683.07  0.04  0.28 
2002 2.13  4.91  869.93  0.03  0.25 
2004 2.17  5.29  1054.70  0.03  0.27 
All 2.15  3.81  617.45  0.04  0.29 
 
 
Table 5b: Thicket Measures – by Market 
 
SOF  # of claims per  
patent citation 
Mean # of non-
patent references 




CR4 of  
citations 
ac_b   2.13  15.88  55.33  0.14  0.51 
ac_t 1.67  3.63  14.80  0.12  0.51 
ai_a   2.22  3.80  548.33  0.02  0.24 
ai_l 2.21  3.07  301.83  0.02  0.25 
ai_n   1.92  7.23  217.83  0.03  0.27 
ba_a 2.62  1.81  272.33  0.05  0.31 
cs_f   2.29  3.14  1274.67  0.03  0.27 
cs_i 2.29  3.14  1274.67  0.03  0.27 
cs_l 2.29  3.14  1274.67  0.03  0.27 
cs_w 2.29 3.14  1274.67  0.03  0.27 
dm_f 2.09 4.01  859.83  0.04  0.32 
dm_mh 2.18  4.09  993.17  0.04  0.32 
dm_mr 2.18  4.09  993.17  0.04  0.32 
dm_q 2.18 4.09  993.17  0.04  0.32 
ma_c 1.80 2.46  153.33  0.03  0.29 
ma_q 1.77 1.04  67.83  0.05  0.31 
oa_gd 2.20  2.28  562.00  0.02  0.21 
oa_me 2.72  3.37  195.00  0.05  0.33 
oa_p 2.34  3.59  378.67  0.04  0.33 
sv_ar 2.04 7.14  294.67  0.03  0.26 
ts_er 1.68  1.03  757.00  0.02  0.21 
ut_h 1.93  1.48  892.83  0.03  0.24 
ut_r 1.97  2.51  589.67  0.03  0.25 
ut_x 2.31  4.30  404.67  0.04  0.31 
ut_y 2.16  2.01  810.83  0.02  0.20 
wd_i 2.29  2.56  366.17  0.04  0.28 
wd_o 2.28 4.97  749.50  0.05  0.29 
All 2.15  3.81  617.45  0.04  0.29 
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Table 6: Market-level results on entry  
Poisson regressions with year and market fixed effects and standard errors clustered by market 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
   Entrants        De novo     Diversifiers 
Key Patent Variables         
Ln(Market's patents)  -0.438  -0.493  -0.411 -0.570 -0.465 -0.365 -0.358 
 (0.140)***  (0.137)***  (0.139)***  (0.290)** (0.304)  (0.143)** (0.139)** 
Average claims per cite in market    -0.371           
   ( 0 . 1 8 2 ) * *        
Non-patent  share  of  prior  art   0.089       
   (0.358)       
D(Regime  change)    0.687   1.779   0.473 
    (0.283)**   (0.894)**   (0.230)** 
D(Regime  change)*ln(market’s  patents)    -0.068   -0.231   -0.039 
         (0.035)**     (0.126)*     (0.025) 
Control Variables         
Ln(Avg Quality of market’s patents)  -1.043  -0.927 -0.849 -0.653 0.010  -1.111 -1.012 
 (0.324)***  (0.346)***  (0.346)**  (0.810) (0.750) (0.349)***  (0.366)*** 
Incumbents  (in  hundreds)  0.869 0.953 0.902 1.207 1.240 0.791 0.816 
  (0.111)*** (0.116)*** (0.102)*** (0.231)*** (0.236)*** (0.087)*** (0.082)*** 
Incumbents (in hundreds) squared  -0.067  -0.075 -0.070 -0.105 -0.108 -0.059 -0.060 
  (0.013)*** (0.015)*** (0.012)*** (0.024)*** (0.024)*** (0.011)*** (0.010)*** 
Growth  of  revenues  0.143 0.145 0.188 0.166 0.206 0.114 0.156 
 (0.072)**  (0.079)*  (0.072)***  (0.112) (0.131) (0.076) (0.077)** 
Modal citation lag  -0.028  -0.048  -0.033 0.001  -0.004 -0.020 -0.023 
 (0.013)**  (0.015)***  (0.014)**  (0.037) (0.037) (0.014) (0.014)* 
Constant  6.604 7.023 5.589 1.794 -1.589  6.747 6.234 
  (1.651)*** (1.818)*** (1.780)*** (3.620) (3.413) (1.752)***  (1.839)*** 
Observations  162 162 162 162 162 162 162 
Log  likelihood  -422.8 -419.5 -418.4 -231.5 -229.4 -383.5 -381.2 
         
   Median marginal effects of interaction terms       
D(Regime change)*ln(market’s patents)      -1.539    -0.47    -0.883 
median standard error      0.793    0.433    0.503 
median  p-value      0.04   0.271   0.083 
Average effect below 25th percentile of 
market  size     -0.651   -0.309   -0.342 
Average effect above 75th percentile of 
market  size     -5.93   -1.815   -3.4 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Estimation method  Poisson  OLS  Poisson 
Dependent variable 
Number of firms in 
market j receiving initial 
funding in year t 
Log of the median 
amt invested in firms 
in market j in year t 
# of IPOs in market j in 
year t 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Patent variables                  
Ln(Market's patents)  -0.704  -0.788  0.911  1.171  2.446  3.181 
  (0.418)* -0.61  (0.517)*  (0.463)**  (1.315)*  (1.417)** 
D(regime change)   -2.759    2.919    6.554 
   (2.80)***    (1.008)***    (1.697)*** 
D(regime change) X ln(patents in market)    -0.395   -0.423   -0.712 
    (4.100)***   (0.079)***   (0.230)*** 
Control Variables                  
Ln(Avg Quality of market’s patents)  -0.334  0.935  -0.142  0.445  5.727  8.135 
  (0.563) -1.099  (0.847)  (0.755) (1.796)***  (1.798)*** 
Modal citation lag  0.100  0.010  0.010  -0.018  -0.241  -0.289 
  (0.060)* (0.044)  (0.044)  (0.053)  (0.247)  (0.260) 
Incumbents (in hundreds)  -0.001  0.000 0.000  0.000 -2.032 -1.650 
 (0.002)  -0.41  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.793)**  (0.841)** 
Incumbents (in hundreds) squared  -0.000 0.002  -0.007  -0.002 0.179  0.140 
  (0.000) -0.75  (0.005)  (0.004) (0.125)  (0.130) 
Growth of revenues  -0.164  -0.27 -0.146  0.006 -0.060 -0.112 
  (0.173) -0.01  (0.155)  (0.137) (0.599)  (0.658) 
# firms "at risk"  0.010  0.017  0.019  0.014  0.024  0.023 
  (0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.012) (0.011)  (0.014)*  (0.013)* 
average age of firms "at risk"  -0.995 -1.016 -0.008  -0.009 -0.091  -0.126 
  (0.126)*** (0.174)*** (0.031) (0.029)  (0.053)*  (0.060)** 
Constant  5.334  -6.032 3.397  -1.559 -41.305 -59.849 
    (5.349)  -10.683  (1.707)* (8.069)  (13.943)*** (13.745)*** 
Observations  231 231 206  206 168  168 
 
 
All regressions include market and year fixed effects. 
Robust standard errors clustered by market in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
   56




Estimation method  Poisson OLS  Poisson 
Dependent variable  Number of firms in 
market j receiving initial 
funding in year t 
Log of the median 
amt invested in firms 
in market j in year t 
# of IPOs in market j in 
year t 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Patent variables                   
Ln(Market's patents)  -0.667  -0.962  0.959  1.165  1.855  1.618 
 (0.430)  (0.530)*  (0.558)* (0.466)**  (1.462)  (1.377) 
Average claims per cite in market  -0.238 -0.100 0.938  0.359  -2.849  -3.002 
 (0.595)  (0.582)  (0.709)  (0.641)  (1.404)**  (1.354)** 
Share of non-patent references  -0.991 -1.869 0.969  0.186  4.698  7.101 
 (0.516)*  (0.391)***  (0.539)* (1.043)  (1.320)***  (3.288)** 
D(regime change)   -1.959    2.616    -4.617 
   (2.044)    (1.419)*    (4.053) 
D(regime change) X ln(patents in market)    -0.542   -0.378   0.302 
    (0.138)***   (0.078)***   (0.288) 
Control Variables                   
Ln(Avg Quality of market’s patents)  -0.799  -0.451  0.112  0.441  8.413  8.563 
 (0.806)  (0.786)  (0.789)  (0.817) (2.201)***  (2.248)*** 
Modal citation lag  0.102  0.059  0.004  -0.016  -0.375  -0.375 
 (0.061)*  (0.049)  (0.039)  (0.050)  (0.251)  (0.248) 
Incumbents (in hundreds)  -0.001  0.003 0.000  0.000 -1.217 -1.185 
 (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.766)  (0.753) 
Incumbents (in hundreds) squared  -0.000 -0.000 -0.009  -0.004 0.096  0.094 
 (0.000)  (0.000)*  (0.005)*  (0.004)  (0.113)  (0.111) 
Growth of revenues  -0.181 -0.244 -0.079  0.016  -0.147  -0.225 
 (0.176)  (0.169)  (0.125)  (0.144)  (0.658)  (0.658) 
# firms "at risk"  0.009  0.006  0.020  0.015  0.027  0.028 
 (0.003)***  (0.003)**  (0.012) (0.012)  (0.013)**  (0.013)** 
average age of firms "at risk"  -1.027 -1.174 -0.015  -0.012 -0.139  -0.123 
 (0.151)***  (0.141)***  (0.034) (0.031)  (0.066)**  (0.059)** 
Constant 10.970  8.400  0.899  -0.877  -51.164  -53.484 
   (6.968)  (7.003)  (7.501)  (6.763)  (18.460)***  (16.581)*** 
Observations  231 231 206  206 168  168 
 
 
All regressions include market and year fixed effects. 
Robust standard errors clustered by market in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 8: Hazard model of initial funding episode 
Dummies for Year, Market and Employment size range category included. 
Standard errors clustered by firm. 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Patent variables  Full sample  Post-regime change 
Discrete-
time* 
Ln Patents in Market  0.708  0.791  0.140  0.124  0.153  1.221 
 (0.259)  (0.276)  (0.111)**  (0.100)*** (0.124)** (0.176) 
Firm’s patents pending  1.112  1.117  1.103  1.102  1.099  1.145 
 (0.059)**  (0.056)**  (0.055)**  (0.055)* (0.055)*  (0.073)** 
Firm’s patents granted  0.996           
 (0.047)           
D(Regime Change)    3.261        3.105 
   (2.727)        (2.726) 
D(Regime Change) X ln (Patents in Market)    0.765        0.754 
   (0.096)**        (0.101)** 
Herfindahl of citations in market        1.148     
       (0.062)***     
Average claims per citation in market          3.282   
         (3.236)   
Share of non-patent prior art          0.146   
        (0.173)**   
Control variables                  
# incumbents  1.003  1.004  1.010  1.009  1.010  1.003 
 (0.002)  (0.002)*  (0.004)**  (0.004)** (0.004)**  (0.001)** 
# incumbents squared  0.999  0.999  0.999  0.999  0.999  0.999 
 (0.000)**  (0.000)**  (0.000)**  (0.000)** (0.000)**  (0.000)*** 
Growth of revenues  1.180  1.147  1.115  1.049  1.047  1.104 
   (0.086)**  (0.087)*  (0.153)  (0.149)  (0.151)  (0.089) 
Firm size range effects  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Year effects  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Market effects  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Log likelihood          
Number of observations  5372 5372  3708   3708 5345 
 
Marginal effects of selected patent variables 
ln Patents in market  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
marginal effect of one std. dev. increase   -0.014 -0.010  -0.042  -0.043  -0.041  0.036 
Firm’s Patents pending       
marginal effect of one unit increase  0.007  0.007  0.007  0.007  0.007  0.009 
D(Regime Change) X ln (Patents in Market)     
Average marginal effect of one log-unit increase in patents           -0.026 
Average standard error of marginal effect          0.016 
 
Coefficients expressed as hazard ratios. Marginal effect of the interaction term calculated using Stata’s predictnl command. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 9: Competing Hazards Multinomial Logit Model of IPO/Acquisition 
Dummies for year, market, stage of investment, and employment size range included. 
Standard errors clustered by firm. 
 
 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5)  (6) 
Sample  All firms  All firms  Firms without patents 
Outcome   IPO   Acquisition  IPO   Acquisition  IPO   Acquisition 
Patent  variables           
Ln Patents in Market  1.480  1.113  1.925*  0.408  0.298**  1.109 
  (0.673) (0.277)  (0.735) (0.716)  (0.165)  (0.320) 
Firm’s  patents  1.254*** 1.180**  1.264*** 1.171**     
  (0.102) (0.093)  (0.086) (0.089)     
Investor's patents   1.000  1.000  1.000**  1.000  1.000  1.000 
  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
D(Regime Change)      0.669  111,842.655     
   (1.535)  (16504339.039)     
   0.970  3.123      D(Regime Change) X 
 ln (Patents in Market)      (0.374)  (5.866)     
Control  variables           
ln Total amount invested  1.230  1.119*  1.192  1.108*  1.262  1.117 
  (0.227) (0.071)  (0.196) (0.069)  (0.225)  (0.089) 
Corporate  investors  1.062 1.032  0.837 1.007  0.098*  1.156 
  (0.427) (0.379)  (0.313) (0.376)  (0.124)  (0.426) 
Investors' previous IPOs  1.001  0.992*  1.002  0.993*  0.997  0.994* 
  (0.002) (0.004)  (0.002) (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.003) 
Number of incumbents  0.996  0.947  1.782**  1.040  0.674  1.000 
  (0.259) (0.172)  (0.466) (0.187)  (0.246)  (0.213) 
Incumbents squared  1.009  0.998  1.013**  0.999  1.000  1.000 
  (0.006) (0.004)  (0.005) (0.004)  (0.015)  (0.005) 
growth of sales  1.000  1.000  1.000***  1.000  1.000  1.000 
  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Observations  2434 2434  2434 2434  1893  1893 
 
All regressions include market and year fixed effects, and dummy variables for the most recent stage of investment 
reached (round) and employment size range. 
Robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses. 
Coefficients expressed as hazard ratios. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 





Timing of regime changes in software patentability for markets in the sample 
Pre-1996 
ba_a  Automatic teller machine software 
ma_c Robotic  software 
ma_q  Quality control software 
ut_h  Peripheral device drivers 
After 1996 
ai_a  Voice technology software 
ai_l  Natural language software 
ai_n  Neural network software 
cs_f Fax  software 
cs_i Internet  tools 
cs_l  Wide area network software 
cs_w  Local area network software 
dm_f File  management  software 
dm_mh Hierarchical  DBMS  software 
dm_mr  Relational DBMS software 
dm_q Database  query  language software 
oa_gd  3D representation software 
oa_me  Electronic message systems software 
oa_p  Desktop publishing software 
sv_ar  Artificial intelligence R&D 
ts_er  Geographic information systems software  
ts_er  Geographic information systems software  
ut_r  Disaster recovery software 
ut_x Security/auditing  software 
ut_y  Performance measuring software 
After 1998 
ac_b Invoicing/Billing  Software 
ac_t  Tax preparation and reporting software 
wd_i  Inventory management software 
wd_o  Order entry/processing software 
 